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Thispaper analyzeslinear productionsituationswithprice uncertainty,and showsthat
the corrresponding stochastic linear production games are totally balanced. It also shows
that investment funds, where investors pool their individual capital for joint investments
in ﬁnancial assets, ﬁt into this framework. For this subclass, the paper provides a proce-
dure to construct an optimal investment portfolio. Furthermore it provides necessary and
sufﬁcient conditionsfor the proportionalrule to result in a core-allocation.
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11 Introduction
Production processes are classic examples of situations where several parties recognize the
beneﬁts of cooperation. The owners of the production factors labor, resources, capital, and
technology join forces to deliver a product or a service that is valued more by consumers than
their separate inputs. The value that is added by production is the beneﬁt of cooperation and
has to be divided between the parties that are involved in the production process.
Owen (1975) was the ﬁrst to analyze this problem from a game theoretical point of
view. In his model, agents have their own individual bundle of resources which they can
use as inputs for a publicly available linear production technology. The resulting output can
be sold on the market for given prices. In this situation, agents can individually use their
resources to maximize the proceeds from production, but they can probably do better if they
cooperatewith eachotherand combinetheirresources. Forinstance, an agentthat lackscertain
inputs for production, prefers cooperating with agents that possess the required inputs, so that
productioncan takeplace. Owen (1975)showsthat thecorrespondinglinear productiongames
are totally balanced. In particular, he shows that a core-allocation arises if each agent receives
the marginal value of his resources. Here, the marginal value of a resource is the marginal
revenue generated by one extra unit of this resource.
The analysis of Owen (1975) as well as most subsequent studies on this subject, conﬁne
themselves to a deterministicsetting. Real production,however, typically features uncertainty.
Due to irregularities in the production process, the quality of produced output may not always
be up to standard so that production losses may occur. If this is the case, there is uncertainty
about the output. Similarly, when production takes a considerable amount of time, there is
uncertainty about the price at the moment that the production decision is made.
Sandsmark (1999) examines the cooperative behavior in a two stage production model
with uncertainty about the output. The ﬁrst stage production plan is determined under un-
certainty while the second stage production plan may be contingent on the realized state of
nature. It is shown that the resulting cooperative game, in which coalitions maximize a certain
revenuefunction, has a nonempty core. Furthermore, a speciﬁc core-allocation is provided.
Similar to chance-constrained games (cf. Charnes and Granot (1973)), this model does not
explicitly take into account the individual preferences of the agents. The revenuefunction,
however, may be interpreted as the sum of individual expected utilities.
In contrast to Sandsmark (1999), this paper analyzes linear production situations with
priceuncertainty. When agentsdecide upontheir productionplan,pricesarestill unknown. As
aresult,pricevolatilitymayplayaroleindecidinghowagentsusetheirresources. Forinstance,
they may use their resources to produce different outputs so as to reduce the variability in total
revenues. We model linear production situations with price uncertainty by means of stochastic
cooperative games and show that the corresponding stochastic linear production games are
balanced. Foran extensive discussion of stochasticcooperativegameswereferto Suijs(1999).
2Linear production games with price uncertainty can be used to describe investment problems,
whereagents can apply their (individual)capital to invest in ﬁnancial assets whosefuturevalue
is uncertain at the time of investment. We discuss this application more detailed in a separate
section.
2 Stochastic Cooperative games
Let usﬁrstrecallsomeofthedeﬁnitionsconcerningstochasticcooperativegamesasintroduced























),w h e r e
N is the set of agents,
X
S the nonempty set
of random payoffs coalition
S can obtain, and
￿
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) of stochastic payoffs with ﬁnite expectation. We assume that for each agent the
preferences are complete, transitive and continuous
1. The class of all cooperative games with
stochastic payoffs with agent set





). For a more extensive discussion of
this model and some examples we refer to Suijs et al. (1999) and Suijs, De Waegenaere and
Borm (1998).


























































S. The set of all allocations
for coalition












































N is a core allocation for
the game
￿ if for each coalition









































S. The set of all core allocations for













N such that for each
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) equals theamount of money
m for which agent
i is indifferent












) is called the certainty equivalent of
X. Condition (M1) states that agent
i weakly prefers one stochastic payoff to another one if and only if the certainty equivalent
of the former is greater than or equal to the certainty equivalent of the latter. Condition (M2)
states that the certainty equivalent is linearly separable in the deterministic amount of money
1The preferences
￿





























































































). It is easy to check that













































































































































































































































of consumption goods. By assumption, each agent
i
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M. The resources can be used to produce consumption goods.













M, and are assumed to be mutually independent.
When coalition
S forms, the members of
S pool their resources and production tech-


















+ denote the consumption bundle that coalition












+ is feasible for
coalition
































































































j. Now, we can































































N. The set of all stochastic










































































































































































































































































). What we can do
though, is determine the Pareto optimal allocation




































































































optimal, if and only if
r







































































i it follows that the objective function is strictly
concave, so that the optimal solution is unique. That
r
￿ is indeed the unique solution follows












































































































































Note that more risk averse agents bear a larger part of the risk. Furthermore, note that
the Paretooptimal allocation
r









yields a Pareto optimal allocation for the optimal production plan.






















































































































L) are convex then the reverse of the statement also
holds and the maximum is unique.
6The following theorem shows that stochastic linear production games are totally bal-
anced.



























), it sufﬁces to show that
￿ is







nonempty core. For this, we apply the well-known result of Bondareva (1963) and Shapley

































































￿ be a balanced map


















































i is that part of the production plan that is produced with the technology
A














































































































































































































































































1and Lemma 1, which states that the


















































































































































With deterministic prices, a core-allocation can be found by appropriately valuating the
different resources, and giving each agent the total value of his own resource bundle. To see






































N. The dual optimization problem of (7) for coalition





























+ be the optimal solution of the dual problem. Then
￿
k represents the marginal
value of resource
k, that is one extra unit of resource


















k as the total






+. Owen (1975) shows that a core-allocation arises
for the linear production game deﬁned in (7), if each agent
i
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k of his individual resource bundle
b
i.
This naturally raises the question if we can construct core-allocations in a similar way



























































1 ,a n d
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5. Note that the production technology uses one unit of input to produce one unit
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N are linearly independent, then






















































































By using a variant of Farka’s Lemma
4, such























































































































































Hence, without loss of generality we may assume that
￿
=













































































































































Although linear independence is a sufﬁcient condition to guarantee the existence of an
appropriate valuation scheme of the resources, this result cannot be obtained without allowing
for negative monetary values, as the following example shows.




































































































































b has a solution















The fact that retail prices are uncertain when individuals decide upon their production plan, is
particularly applicable to investment funds. For at the time that people invest their capital in
ﬁnancial assets, they are not sure about the future value of this asset. To reduce the volatility
of the total returns, they may prefer to participate in an investment fund to obtain a more
diversiﬁed portfolio.
Besides reducing volatility,peoplemay also beneﬁt fromcooperationif thereturnvaries
with the amount of capital invested. Bank deposits, for instance, usually earn a higher interest
rate when more capital is deposited. These problems were introduced by Lemaire (1983) and
furtheranalyzed by Izquierdo and Rafels (1996) and Borm, De Waegenaere, Rafels, Suijs, Tijs
and Timmer (1999). The latter extended the former model by considering several periods so
as to include term- dependent interest rates. In contrast to the model we present here, the three
previous models abstract from risk bearing investments. Instead, they assume that the earned
interest rates are known with certainty beforehand.




N of risk averse expected



























+ available for investments in several,





































+ of assets is feasible for coalition
S
￿
N if they have sufﬁcient capital at






























j. Since agents are not forced to invest all their capital in risky assets, we























































































N, where the preferences
￿
￿
i are induced by
U



















). For investing in a risky
asset can be described by a simple production technology, that uses a single resource, i.e.
capital, to produce several commodities, i.e. ﬁnancial assets. The production technology is







M: the asset price
￿
j denotes how much of the resource
capital is needed to produce one unit of asset
j
2
M. The prices at which produced output can
be sold are the random returns
R
j. Hence, we obtain the following result.








104.1 The Optimal Investment Portfolio
The relatively simple production technology in ﬁnancial games enables us to provide a more
detailed analysis of the optimal investment portfolio. Using the Pareto optimality result of
Proposition 1, the optimal portfolio
q
￿ of coalition


































































Recall that there is a risk-free asset
j
0 yielding the risk-free interest rate
r
￿





















































































g. Instead of focusing on the quantities, we can also focus on the capital



































































































































































































S prefers investing in the risk-free asset to not investing at all, all the capital






























































































































































































































































































































































































































)represents the marginal return on investment in terms of certainty equivalents that
coalition







j dollars in asset
j. Note that the marginal return is decreasing
5 in
the capital invested. Similarly,
r represents the cost of capital, that is the marginal return of
investing an additional dollar in the risk-free asset. In order to maximize the the total return, a
coalition should invest in the asset with the largest marginal return on investment that exceeds
the cost of capital. If such investments do not exist, the remaining capital should be invested
in the risk-free asset. Hence, we can construct the optimal portfolio in the following way.





































































1 invested in asset
j











either one of the following three things will happen: the capital runs out, the marginal return









In the ﬁrst case, the current investments make up the optimal portfolio, while in the second
case, the remaining capital is invested in the risk-free asset. In the third case, it is optimal
































). Again, as the investments increase, themarginal returns decrease
simultaneously, and either of the following three things will happen: the capital runs out, the









). The procedure continues in a similar way until either the capital
runs out, or the marginal return of all assets in the portfolioequals the cost of capital.
Let us illustrate this procedure with an example.













5, who can invest their
individual capital of $
2 and $
4 inthree riskyassets and a risk-freeasset. The risk-freeinterest




























































































































































1 has the largest marginal return, coalition
S starts with investing in asset
1 and














































































2 until the available capital of $




























































2, but is constrained by its

























































































































N. From (11) it follows that coalition
S does certainly















0. Since the marginal return
is strictly decreasing in
x


































r , which proves (1).






























). Recall that in
the construction of the optimal portfolio,coalition
S starts with investing in asset
j
1, continues



























































on investment that determines whether or not a coalition should invest in it. The variability
in the asset’s return only plays a role in determining the quantity that is invested. Consider,
for example, the following two assets. Asset
1 has a price of $
9
























9 with certainty. Since the expected return of asset







%, it is optimal to start investing in asset
1, although it involves (much) more risk than
asset
2.
4.2 The Proportional Rule
The proportional rule is most commonly used by investment funds to allocate the returns to




%, each individual participant earns
1
2
% on the amount of capital that he contributed to
the fund. So, the individual rate of return does not depend on the amount of capital brought in.
Izquierdo and Rafels (1996) and Borm et al. (1999) show that the proportional rule results in a
core-allocation for deposit games, in which the rate of return is risk-free and dependent on the
term and the amount of the bank deposit. For the class of ﬁnancial games introduced in this















+ denote the optimal portfolio. We
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k . The proportional rule










































￿, however, is not proportional in the sense that each individual
i
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that is distributed proportionally by





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































for at least one
j
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Second, in this paper we only discussed price uncertainty, but the stochastic linear
production game also applies to situations where there is uncertainty in the production process
due to production losses. Production losses may occur when produced output does not satisfy
prespeciﬁed (quality) standards. We can express these losses as a percentage of the production
plan. Consider, for instance, a producer of audio and video tapes, and suppose that production
losses are
2







































j denote the deterministic retail price of good
j
2





































































































N. Note that this model can easily be










k,a st w o











































0, is strictly concave in
x.






























































































































































































































0, it follows that
h
c is concave. The lemma then follows
from the observation that the inequalityis binding if and only if












F be a probability distribution function corresponding to a







































0, is strictly decreasing in
x.








































































































































c is decreasing. Similar to the proof of Lemma 1, the result followsfrom the observationthat
the inequality is binding if and only if
F corresponds to a degenerate random variable.
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